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Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) increase the ability and tendency to devote
greater attentional control to a task—improving performance on a wide range of skills. In addition, recent research on enclothed cognition demonstrates that the situational influence of wearing a white lab
coat increases controlled attention, due to the symbolic meaning and physical experience of wearing the
coat. We examined whether these positive influences on attentional control lead to negative performance
outcomes on insight problem-solving, a task thought to rely on associative processes that operate largely
outside of explicit attentional control. Participants completed matchstick arithmetic problems while either
wearing a white lab coat or in a no-coat control condition. Higher WMC was associated with lower insight
problem-solving accuracy in the no-coat condition. In the coat condition, the insight problem-solving accuracy of lower WMC individuals dropped to the level of those higher in WMC. These results indicate that
wearing a white lab coat led individuals to increase attentional control towards problem solving, hindering even lower WMC individuals from engaging in more diffuse, associative problem-solving processes,
at which they otherwise excel. Trait and state factors known to increase controlled attention and improve
performance on more attention-demanding tasks interact to hinder insight problem-solving.

Working memory enables individuals to select, maintain,
and update information relevant to current goals or contexts, in the presence of internal and external distraction,
and across diverse and ongoing cognitions (Engle, 2002; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, Engle, 2014; Unsworth & Engle,
2007). Because of the importance of these attention- and
memory-related abilities to a wide variety of higher-order
cognitive tasks, individuals with higher working memory
capacity (WMC) generally exhibit a performance advantage
over those with lower WMC (see Barrett, Tugade, & Engle,
2004, for a review). However, the advantage of higher WMC
can be disrupted by situational factors that temporarily reduce one’s attentional resources, such as sleep deprivation
(Ilkowska & Engle, 2010), performance pressure (Beilock &
Carr, 2005), and performing two tasks at once (e.g., Rosen
& Engle, 1997). Given its importance to professional and
academic achievement (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Hambrick
& Meinz, 2011; Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, & Spillers,
2012), and close relationship with fluid intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005;
Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel,
2014), it is not surprising that researchers are interested in
finding ways to increase WMC (Harrison et al., 2014; Klingberg, 2010; Melby-Lervåg & Hulm, 2013; Morrison & Chein,
2011; Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). This goal is the basis for adaptive computerized training (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl,
Jonides, & Shah, 2012; Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012),

and other activities targeting trait abilities (e.g., Diamond &
Lee, 2011; Moreau & Conway, 2014), as well as state-based
interventions, such as mindfulness meditation (Jha, Stanley,
Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013) and journaling (Klein & Boals,
2001; Ramirez & Beilock, 2011).
However, recent evidence suggests that higher levels of attentional control can harm performance on tasks that benefit
from a more diffuse focus of attention, such as insight problem-solving (DeCaro, Van Stockum, & Wieth, under review;
Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a). In the current study, we examine
the interaction between trait and state factors known to increase attentional control. We hypothesize that higher levels
of attentional control may hinder insight problem-solving,
whether produced by individual differences in WMC or a
situational factor shown to increase controlled attention
by eliciting deliberative thinking—wearing a white lab coat
(Adam & Galinsky, 2012). Although greater attentional control is generally thought to be good for performance, it is
possible that interventions designed to enhance controlled
attention may restrict the ability to notice useful information
that is important for some tasks, especially those that rely on
creative or associative processes.

Executive Attention and Insight
Insight is the experience of suddenly realizing the solution
to a problem that, just prior to this realization, appeared
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insurmountable. Insight problems are problems that tend to
evoke this experience, and share characteristics that differentiate them from other kinds of problems (Bowden, JungBeeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Chu & MacGregor, 2011;
Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). The ability to attain insight often
requires an individual to abandon prior ways of thinking and
represent a problem in a new or unexpected way.
According to special-process theory, insight solutions
emerge from a set of cognitive processes that are not typically required for non-insight problem-solving (Bowden
et al., 2005; Chein & Weisberg, 2014; Schooler & Melcher,
1995). Specifically, it is believed that when individuals encounter a problem, they first create a mental representation of the problem and its parameters (Novick & Bassock, 2005). Afterward, they select a solution approach in
keeping with their representation of the problem (Mayer &
Hegarty, 1996). However, with insight problem-solving, the
initial representation is typically incorrect, and individuals often find themselves at an impasse (Ash, Jee, & Wiley,
2012; Ohlsson, 1992). To overcome impasse, individuals
must generate a new representation of the problem (i.e., restructure), in order to identify a viable solution approach
(Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider,
& Rhenius, 1999). Importantly, the ability to restructure is
thought to depend on associative processes (e.g., spreading
activation) that operate largely outside of conscious attentional control (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; Bowden et
al., 2005; Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Durso, Rea, & Dayton, 1994; Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler, Ohlsson,
& Brooks, 1993; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv,
1995; Siegler, 2000). Insight is attained when individuals restructure their representation of the problem in a way that
the solution path becomes suddenly apparent, leading to the
characteristic “aha!” moment commonly associated with insight problem-solving (Kounios, & Beeman, 2009; Smith &
Kounios, 1996).
Evidence that insight problem-solving relies on associative processes comes from research demonstrating that factors that interfere with controlled attention actually improve
insight problem-solving. For example, insight problem-solving is improved for individuals known to have lower trait
levels of inhibitory control, such as individuals with frontal lobe damage (Reverberi, Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap,
2005), Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD;
White & Shah, 2011), or lower WMC (DeCaro et al., under
review). Moreover, situational factors that reduce state levels
of inhibition, such as moderate alcohol intoxication (Jarosz,
Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012) and solving problems during one’s
non-optimal time of day (Wieth & Zacks, 2011), improve
insight accuracy.
If a more diffuse focus of attention benefits insight, then
insight problem-solving may be hindered by factors that

increase attention to the problem-solving process. Controlled attention may reduce insight problem-solving accuracy for two reasons. First, attentional control supports
the ability to inhibit distractions and focus on goal-relevant
information (Engle, 2002; Engle & Kane, 2003; Unsworth
& Engle, 2007), narrowing one’s search through the problem space (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a), and constraining search
sets in secondary or long-term memory (Unsworth & Engle,
2007). Although generally useful for solving non-insight
problems, such focused attention may lead individuals to
overlook more distantly-related information held outside
the perceived problem space (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a). Second, attentional control supports one’s ability to execute
complex problem-solving approaches (Hambrick & Engle,
2003; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012b). However, if individuals persist in using such approaches, then they may be slower to
recognize that their initial representation of the problem has
created an impasse that can only be overcome by developing
a new representation of the problem (Schooler, Fallshore, &
Fiore, 1995). In support of these ideas, studies demonstrate
that priming a more narrow focus of attention alters how
individuals approach problems, resulting in less-creative solutions (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003), and
fewer reports of insight (Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky,
Kounios, & Beeman, 2012).
WMC is one individual-difference factor that supports
the ability to allocate controlled attention toward task performance. Indeed, it is thought that the ability to keep memory
and attention organized around relevant information drives
the positive relationship between WMC and performance
on a wide range of skills (Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth
et al., 2014). Research demonstrates that individuals initially
prefer, or are biased towards, using these complex strategies
when they have the attentional resources to do so (DeCaro &
Beilock, 2010; Schelble, Therriault, & Miller, 2012). For example, higher WMC individuals tend to look for patterns in
random sequences (Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig, 2004),
and continue to use complex, time-consuming algorithmic
problem-solving approaches when simpler, more efficient
strategies are available (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro,
Thomas, & Beilock, 2008). Thus, attentional control not only
enables but may also promote a tendency to implement complex problem-solving approaches—even if a controlled task
approach is unnecessary or suboptimal (e.g., Gaissmaier,
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2006).
If higher WMC supports the ability and tendency to focus
attention during problem solving, then this trait factor may
lead to poorer performance on insight problems. In support
of this idea, DeCaro, Van Stockum, and Wieth (under review) found that higher WMC individuals performed less accurately than lower WMC individuals on insight matchstick
arithmetic problems. As discussed in greater detail below,
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insight matchstick arithmetic problems require individuals Current Study
to relax constraints that are typically associated with mathematical problem-solving (e.g., that there should be only one The current study examined the independent and joint effects
equal sign in an equation) in order to transform an incorrect of WMC and wearing a white lab coat during insight probarithmetical statement into a correct one (Knoblich et al., lem-solving, in order to investigate how trait and state influ1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; Öllinger, Jones, & ences on attention interact to impact performance on tasks
Knoblich, 2008). When they encounter an insight problem, thought to benefit from less attentional control. The problems
higher WMC may encourage individuals to persist within a that participants completed are thought to depend on insight,
conventional, yet faulty, problem representation suited to an to the extent that participants must inhibit their tendency
attention-demanding approach, in line with their exception- to approach the problems using typical mathematical steps
al attentional control abilities (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009).
and algorithms, while also flexibly restructuring their initial
State factors may also lead individuals to allocate con- problem representation to overcome impasse (Knoblich et
trolled attention towards problem solving, thereby impeding al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also Jones, 2003; Ohlsson,
insight. As discussed above, several studies have demonstrat- 1992, 2011). Specifically, participants completed matchstick
ed that insight problem-solving can be improved by tempo- arithmetic problems, which are composed of false arithmetic
rarily reducing state levels of attentional control (Jarosz et al., statements using matchsticks representing Roman numerals,
2012; Wieth & Zacks, 2011). In line with such findings, other arithmetic operators (addition and subtraction symbols), and
studies suggest that the converse may also be true—insight equal signs (see Figure 1). Participants were asked to transproblem-solving can be harmed by temporarily increasing form these false equations into true equations by moving a
state levels of attentional control (Friedman et al., 2003; We- single matchstick to a different location or orientation.
gbreit et al., 2012).
Participants completed both non-insight and insight
One means by which state attentional control may be matchstick arithmetic problems. Non-insight matchstick
increased is through the influence of an article of clothing problems (standard type problems; Knoblich et al., 1999;
worn by the individual—a phenomenon known as enclothed Öllinger et al., 2008) are solved by moving a matchstick repcognition (Adam & Galinsky, 2012). Enclothed cognition resenting the number 1 (“I”) from one position to another.
an equation, and performance on these problems is consistently cl
represents a specific case of embodied reordering
cognition, values
which inThese
problems rely on simple rule-based approaches consisrecognizes that individuals’ psychological processes are in- tent with prior experience reordering values in an equation,
ceiling (Knoblich
al., 1999, 2001). In the current study, non-insight problems were u
fluenced by their physical experiences (Niedenthal,
2007; etand
thus are unlikely to induce impasse or demand repreWilson, 2002). Specifically, the theory of enclothed cogni- sentational change (Knoblich et al., 2001; Knoblich, Öllinger,
filler items
reduce transfer across insight matchstick problems. Solving insight prob
tion posits that the clothes people wear influence
theirtopsy& Spivey, 2005; Öllinger et al., 2008). In the current study,
chological processes by leading the wearer to behave in ways non-insight problems were used as filler items to reduce
relaxation problems; Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also O
that are consistent with the clothes’ popular(constraint
symbolic meantransfer across insight matchstick problems. In contrast, ining. For example, Adam and Galinsky (2012) demonstrated sight matchstick problems (constraint relaxation problems;
requiresand
relaxing certain preconceptions about equations (e.g., that equations hav
that wearing a white lab coat, prototypical2002)
of scientists
Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also Ohlsson,
doctors, is commonly associated with carefulness, attentive- 2002) require relaxing certain preconceptions about equaequal sign).
problems are solved by changing the addition symbol to an equ
ness, and responsibility (i.e., deliberative one
thinking).
In lineThese
tions (e.g., that equations have only one equal sign), and
with these symbolic associations, Adam and Galinsky found are likely to induce impasse and demand representational
Figure(i.e.,
1), and
thought to rely on more associative-based approaches to reach s
that performance on measures of selective(see
attention
a are
change (Knoblich et al., 2005; Öllinger et al., 2008). These
Stroop task) and sustained attention (i.e., a comparative vi- problems are solved by changing the addition symbol to an
(Knoblich
et al., 1999, 2001; Knoblich, Öllinger, & Spivey, 2005) Reverberi et al., 200
sual search task) improved when individuals
were randomly
equal sign (see Figure 1), and are thought to rely on more
assigned to wear a white lab coat. However, performance did
Figure
1. 1. Example matchstick arithmetic problems
Figure
not improve when the lab coat was identified as an “artistic Matchstick
arithmetic problems
painter’s coat” as opposed to a “medical doctor’s coat.” PerInsight
formance also did not improve when participants merely saw
the lab coat displayed on the desk in front of them throughout the experiment, but did not wear the coat. These results
suggest that wearing a lab coat leads individuals to embody
the associated symbolic meaning, influencing the extent to
Filler (Non-insight)
which they devote attentional control to the task (Adam &
Galinsky, 2012). In particular, a white lab coat appears to
trigger heightened controlled processing that is likely to benefit performance on a variety of attention-demanding tasks.
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps
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associative-based approaches to reach solution (Knoblich et
al., 1999, 2001, 2005; Reverberi et al., 2005).
During the problem-solving task, one group of participants was asked to wear a white lab coat (coat condition),
as a state manipulation of their attentional control; the others did not wear a lab coat (no-coat control condition). After
the problem-solving portion of the experiment, participants
completed an assessment of WMC, providing a measure of
their trait ability to focus attention in a controlled manner
(Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). We were particularly interested in observing how greater attentional control—whether generated by higher trait WMC or a state
manipulation of clothing—impacts insight problem-solving
accuracy. Lower WMC individuals have been shown to outperform higher WMC individuals on insight problems, possibly because they use more flexible and diffuse attention
to approach the problems (DeCaro et al., under review).
However, with the addition of a white lab coat to elicit attentiveness, we expected lower WMC individuals to perform
as poorly as higher WMC individuals. Such a finding would
illustrate the interaction of trait and state factors on insight
problem-solving. Moreover, such findings would represent a
caveat to the traditional emphasis on improving attentional
control: Manipulations intended to improve attentional control may hinder insight, particularly for those individuals
who are typically best able to perform these tasks.

during construction, everyone wore coats (“doctor’s coats”
or “painter’s coats,” depending on condition). Even though
the construction was completed, participants were asked to
wear the coat, so that all participants would be in the same
situation. However, we did not fully replicate the methodology used by Adam and Galinsky (2012), who called each
coat either a “medical doctor’s coat” or an “artistic painter’s
coat” and did not include a distinction between coats in the
experiment in which they used the construction cover story.
Given the pervasive association between creativity and art
in lay conceptions of creativity (Glăveanu, 2014), including
the word “artistic” potentially triggered implicit theories of
creativity (Hass, 2014), which deviate from trait profiles typically attributed to doctors and scientists (Feist, 1998). However, in the context of the construction cover story, a “painter’s coat” is unlikely to be associated with creativity, and
more with qualities attributed to everyday professionals (i.e.,
a conventional painter in a construction setting; Glăveanu,
2014). Due to the minor contribution of this manipulation to
the overall methodology (i.e., the word “doctor’s” or “painter’s” coat was only mentioned two times), and the finding of
Adam and Galinsky (2012, Experiment 1) that simply wearing a lab coat with no explicit label increased attention, we
therefore ultimately expected to find no differences between
the two coat conditions.

Methods

Problem-Solving Task

Participants
Participants were 96 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes (73 female; age M = 20.89, SD = 4.02; range
18–43 years). An additional six participants were excluded
from the study: three for prior exposure to matchstick arithmetic problems, two for committing more than 20 percent
errors on the sentence portion of the working memory task
(aRspan; Conway et al., 2005), and one for failing to comply with instructions (i.e., put coat on backwards). An additional two participants were identified as univariate outliers
(scored below 2.5 SD from the mean on the WMC measure).
Participants received course credit for participation.
Coat Manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: coat (n = 55), or no-coat control (n = 41). Participants
in the coat condition were additionally randomly assigned
to either a “doctor’s coat” (n = 30) or “painter’s coat” (n = 25)
condition, and provided a cover story adapted from Adam
and Galinsky (2012, Experiment 1). Participants in the
coat condition were told that construction had taken place
in the lab earlier in the semester, and to protect clothing

Materials
Matchstick Arithmetic (Knoblich et al., 1999) was used as
the problem-solving measure. Matchstick arithmetic problems are false arithmetic statements written with Roman numerals (I, II, III, etc.), arithmetic operators (+, −), and equal
signs depicted as matchsticks. Each matchstick problem is
composed of three roman numerals separated by an operator
and an equal sign, and has a unique solution consisting of a
single move. For each problem, participants were instructed
to transform the false arithmetic statement into a true arithmetic statement while adhering to the following rules: (a)
only one matchstick can be moved, (b) matchsticks cannot
be discarded or added, and (c) the answer must be a correct
arithmetic statement. Participants completed three insight
problems and three non-insight problems used as filler problems (Figure 1), presented in random order on the computer.
Participants recorded their answers on paper. Each problem
was displayed for a maximum of two minutes before automatically advancing to the next problem.
Working Memory Measure
The Automated Reading Span task (aRspan) was used to
measure WMC (Redick et al., 2012). The aRspan is a complex memory span task, which interleaves a secondary
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attention-demanding processing task between items presented
for serial recall. In the aRspan, participants are shown a sentence and asked to determine whether it makes sense or not;
then they are shown a letter. After a sequence of 3–7 sentenceletter strings, participants are asked to recall the letters in order. A total of 15 sequences of sentence-letter strings, including
three of each length, are presented in random order. ARspan
scores consist of the total number of memory items (i.e., letters) recalled correctly, regardless of serial position (Conway
et al., 2005; Redick et al., 2012). Scores range from 0–75, with
higher scores denoting greater levels of attentional control (i.e.,
WMC; Kane et al., 2001; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle,
2005). The task takes 15–20 minutes to complete.

Insight Problem Accuracy (Percent)

significant differences in non-insight problem-solving accuracy were found, either as a function of condition, WMC, or
their interaction (M = 38.19%, SD = 33.50, all ps > .3).
We examined the impact of WMC and condition on insight problem-solving accuracy using ordinary least squares
regression. Helmert contrast-coded variables were employed to test planned comparisons between conditions.
The first contrast allowed us to test for differences between
the two coat conditions (doctor’s coat versus painter’s coat),
and the second contrast allowed us to examine differences
between the no-coat condition and the two coat conditions
combined (see West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996). The model included WMC scores (mean centered), the two contrast-coded condition variables, and a WMC by condition interaction
Procedure
term for each contrast.
After providing informed consent, participants were seated
There was no main effect of WMC (B = -.01, SE = .01, p =
in private testing rooms. Participants randomly assigned to .525). There was also no main effect of condition for either
the coat condition were then given the cover story described contrast-coded variable (doctor’s coat versus painter’s coat: B
above. Participants in the no-coat control condition were not = -.30, SE = .30, p = .298; no-coat versus coat conditions comasked to wear a coat and were not given any additional in- bined: B = -.13, SE = .22, p = .555). As expected, there was
structions. All participants then completed the matchstick no interaction between WMC and the doctor’s coat versus
arithmetic problems. Following the problem-solving task, painter’s coat contrast (B = .06, SE = .02, p = .773), suggesting
participants in the coat condition were told that the remain- that the relationship between WMC and insight probleming activities were new to the experiment, and coats were col- solving accuracy was similar across the two coat conditions.
lected. Then, all participants completed the aRspan. Finally, However, as predicted, a significant WMC by condition inparticipants completed a questionnaire with items about pre- teraction was found when the two coat conditions were comvious experience with matchstick arithmetic problems and bined (i.e., no-coat condition versus combined coat condiTaken
together,
demographics, and were debriefed.
tion;
B =in .06,
= .03,
p = .021,
sr2 = .05).
that the data were
.505:1
favorSE
of the
alternative
hypothesis,
or rather,
1.98
times more likely t
these findings suggest that the act of wearing a white lab coat
occur under a model
including an interaction
between
WMC and
conditiondifferently,
(no-coat, coat) than a
Results
led individuals
to perform
the insight
problems
model without it.depending on differences in WMC.
We hypothesized that trait and state factors that increase
In addition, the data were examined by estimating a Bayes
attentional control would interact to reduce insight prob- factor using Bayesian Information Criteria (Jarosz & Wiley,
Figure 2.
lem-solving accuracy. Specifically, we predicted that higher 2014). This analysis compares the fit of the data under the
WMC would be associated with less accurate insight prob- Figure 2.
Insight problem accuracy as a function of working memory capacity and condition.
lem-solving in the no-coat (control) condition. Additionally, Insight problem accuracy as a function of working memory
we predicted that wearing a white lab coat would reduce in- capacity and condition.
100
sight problem-solving accuracy. Because of methodological
differences between our study and that of Adam and GalinNo-Coat Condition
sky (2012), we did not expect to find differences between the
Coat Condition
“doctor’s coat” and “painter’s coat” conditions. We expected
67
that wearing a white lab coat would primarily impact lower
WMC individuals, by reducing their insight problem-solving accuracy relative to the performance of lower WMC in33
dividuals in the no-coat condition.
We first examined WMC scores as a function of condition, to verify random assignment and rule out the potential for any carryover effects from the coat manipulation. No
0
significant differences were found (no-coat condition: M =
Lower (-1SD)
Higher (+1SD)
58.41, SD = 8.30; coat condition: M = 59.35, SD = 8.54; F
Working Memory Capacity
< 1). Non-insight (filler) problems were submitted to the
Note: Lower and higher working memory points are plotted
same analyses as insight problems (described below). No at ±1SD from the mean.
Note: Lower and higher working memory points are plotted at ±1SD from the mean.
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null hypothesis to that under the alternative hypothesis. An
estimated Bayes factor (null/alternative) suggested that the
data were .505:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or
rather, 1.98 times more likely to occur under a model including an interaction between WMC and condition (no-coat,
coat) than a model without it.
Subsequent regression analyses were conducted to examine the nature of this interaction. As shown in Figure 2, WMC
was significantly negatively associated with insight problemsolving accuracy in the no-coat condition (B = −.05, SE =
.02, p = .015, sr2 = .06). No relationship between WMC and
insight problem-solving accuracy was observed for the coat
condition (B = .01, SE = .02, p = .422). We also compared insight problem-solving accuracy between the coat and no-coat
conditions separately for individuals scoring higher or lower
on the WMC measure, by recentering the WMC variable at 1
SD above and below the mean, respectively (Cohen, Cohen,
Aiken, & West, 2003). For lower WMC individuals, wearing
the coat significantly reduced insight problem-solving accuracy, compared to the accuracy of lower WMC individuals in
the no-coat control condition (B = −.67, SE = .31, p = .036,
sr2 = .04). For higher WMC individuals, no significant differences in insight problem-solving accuracy were found between conditions (B = .42, SE = .32, p = .188). Wearing a white
lab coat appears to have selectively impaired insight problemsolving for lower WMC individuals, leading them to perform
in a manner comparable to higher WMC individuals.

Discussion
Attentional control benefits performance on a range of higher-order cognitive tasks (see Barrett et al., 2004, for a review).
Indeed, it is generally assumed that individuals with higher
trait attentional control hold a performance advantage over
those with lower attentional control (Engle, 2002; Hambrick
& Meinz, 2011; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle,
2009). Recent interest in situational factors that temporarily increase state attentional control (Autin & Croizet, 2012),
and the potential for training (Sternberg, 2008), is guided
by such findings. The current study examined whether two
factors previously shown to increase controlled attention—
higher WMC (Kane et al., 2001) and wearing a white lab coat
(Adam & Galinsky, 2012)—have the counterintuitive effect
of decreasing insight problem-solving accuracy, thought to
rely on associative processes operating largely outside of conscious control (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005; Bowers et al., 1990;
Durso et al., 1994; Schooler et al., 1993; Siegler, 2000).
Participants completed insight problems (matchstick
arithmetic; Knoblich et al., 1999), while either wearing a
white lab coat (coat condition) or not (no-coat condition). Afterward, participants completed a measure of WMC. Higher
WMC was associated with poorer insight problem-solving

accuracy in the no-coat control condition. However, when
participants wore a white lab coat, an act commonly associated with deliberative thinking, lower WMC individuals performed just as poorly as higher WMC individuals. Wearing
the lab coat appears to have co-opted lower WMC individuals’ advantage during insight problem-solving.
These findings contribute to a growing body of research
demonstrating that higher WMC does not confer a performance advantage on all tasks, and can even hinder performance on tasks that demand a less-controlled approach
(DeCaro & Beilock, 2010). In the context of problem solving,
a more diffuse focus of attention may allow individuals to see
less obvious but potentially insightful solution paths (Wiley &
Jarosz, 2012a). Previous studies have demonstrated that trait
and state factors that reduce controlled attention increase
insight accuracy (DeCaro et al., under review; Jarosz et al.,
2012; Reverberi et al., 2005; Wieth & Zacks, 2011). The current study complements and expands upon this literature by
demonstrating that factors that increase controlled attention
interact to harm insight. Critically, increasing state attentional control selectively impaired the performance of individuals
who would otherwise excel (i.e., those with lower WMC).
In addition, these findings suggest that situational factors that temporarily increase attentional control lead lower
WMC individuals to adopt information-processing strategies that are more characteristic of higher-capacity individuals. Previous research suggests several possible ways this
processing shift may occur. For example, individuals may be
more likely to persist with algorithmic, attention-demanding
strategies that are less optimal for insight problem-solving
(cf. Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro et al., 2008; Gaissmaier et al., 2006). Alternatively, the white lab coat may have
induced a more local (i.e., narrow) information-processing
style, leading individuals to focus on the component parts
of a problem (Luria & Vogel, 2011; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein,
& Humphreys, 2008). Local processing has been shown to
detriment insight problem-solving, relative to a more global
processing style, in which attention is directed towards overall patterns and meaningful relationships or configurations
(Friedman et al., 2003; see Förster & Denzler, for a review).
Similarly, greater attentional control may lead individuals to
“overshadow” non-verbal processes important for insight,
by promoting explicit, detail-oriented verbal representations
that rely more heavily on attentional control (Chin & Schooler, 2008; Schooler et al., 1993). Future research is needed to
more fully explore the mechanisms by which increasing attentional control harms insight.
The current findings also provide additional evidence for
the impact of enclothed cognition on information processing and task performance. The theory of enclothed cognition
suggests that physically wearing clothing associated with certain symbolic meaning (e.g., a white lab coat, associated with
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qualities typically attributed to scientific or medical professions) leads the wearer to behave in accordance with that
symbolic meaning (Adam & Galinsky, 2012). In support of
this theory, Adam and Galinsky (2012) found that wearing
a white lab coat was associated with carefulness and attentiveness, and likewise improved performance on attentiondemanding tasks. We extend this finding to demonstrate that
wearing a lab coat can lead to sub-optimal insight problem
solving. Although Adam and Galinsky’s findings imply that
wearing certain types of clothing is more likely to lead to success, the current results suggest that optimal performance
depends on a fit between situational factors (e.g., clothing
type), individual differences, and task demands.
The theory of enclothed cognition is based on more general theories of embodied cognition, which emphasize the
role that the body and the environment play in perception,
knowledge, and behavior (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; Pezzulo et
al., 2011; Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). The majority of research on embodied cognition demonstrates that
embodiment activates existing knowledge. However, recent
studies have also explored the role of embodiment in the creation of new knowledge or insights. For example, enacting
certain metaphors for creative thinking, such as “thinking
outside the box” (Leung et al., 2012) or “going with one’s gut”
(Aiello, Jarosz, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012), increases performance on creative tasks. The current findings contribute to
this discourse by demonstrating the converse—that embodiment can inhibit the creation of new knowledge or insights.
In conclusion, situational factors that temporarily increase attentional control, such as the embodied act of wearing a white lab coat, may have a counterproductive impact
on the production of insight. These findings reveal an important potential downside to trait- and state-based working
memory training and enhancement. Although improving
attentional control generally benefits performance on attention-demanding tasks, it may selectively impair performance
for individuals who might otherwise be more insightful.
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